I'm pretty much convinced that there is no way the U.S. can succeed in building an Iraqi army. It all comes down to middle management. I've posted before about the importance of captains, lieutenants, and NCOs in the military. They are the backbone of the ogranization. It takes years to train good ones. And that very fact is the reason the idea of Iraqifying the battle against the insurgents is hamstrung. Enlisted men are fungible. Well qualified captains, lieutenants, and NCOs are not.
I disagree. In 1939, the United States had one of the smallest armies in the world. Six years later, it had one of the best.
Not to put it too delicately, but you're talking about the difficulty of building a peacetime army. I don't think it's being too negative to believe that the Iraqi army will not being facing a truly peaceful situation for months or even years, and will have an opportunity to develop the leadership it deserves.
Then they can attack Syria.
Posted by: monkey David at December 31, 2004 05:50 PMOf course, that was when the U.S. was fighting a war with overwhelming popular support, little to no division over the war in Congress, a strong international economy, definable nations with limited resources and (mostly) conventional tactics as enemies, and of course the draft, which was almost unnecessary because volunteers were plentiful. We also had an administration and War Department that knew what advice to take and when to back down on that advice, a military command structure that could respond to changing situations and would admit to fault at least part of the time, a booming war economy, and unanimous support from those in the international community that we weren't fighting. What followed was the Cold War, thanks to the horrific new ways we had invented of killing more people in an uglier fashion, so I guess everything does turn up roses in the end.
Posted by: RedAssedBaboon at January 2, 2005 06:46 AM